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In Defense of "False Consciousness"
Steven Lukest

I want to defend the answer to a question. The answer is
"false consciousness." I will turn to the question in a moment,
but first I want to comment on why attributing false consciousness to people, a practice I seek here to defend as sometimes legitimate and appropriate, can seem highly objectionable. The
concept of false consciousness is closely associated with others,
notably that of "real" or "true" or "objective" interests, that is, of
interests that false consciousness supposedly conceals from those
whose interests they are. Those who object to this answer generally do so on two distinct, even opposite, grounds. The first, more
traditional objection is that these concepts suggest an arrogant
assumption of superior knowledge, an assumption notably embedded in the Marxist tradition-a claim to privileged access to
what is "correct," a claim theorized by Georg Lukacs and well
exemplified by Leninists, Trotskyists, Stalinists, and Communist
Party apparatchiks across the decades of the twentieth centuryand a corresponding disposition to treat people as cultural dupes.
The second objection is more recent. The suggestion, commonly
associated with postmodernist thinking, is that there cannot be
false consciousness since there are multiple true consciousnesses-socially constructed "regimes of truth," generated and sustained by power. On this view, to impute false consciousness is
mistakenly to believe that there even could be a correct view that
is not itself imposed by power. So I want to defend the answer,
separated, if that is possible, from the bad names it has acquired-and raise the question whether, thus defended, the answer is subject to either of these objections, or, worse still, both.
So what is the question? It was, I think, first asked by Montaigne's friend Etienne de la Bo6tie, author of Discoursde la sert Professor of Sociology, New York University.
1 Georg Lukdcs, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics
(first published 1923) (MIT Press 1972) (Rodney Livingstone, trans). See also Georg Lukdcs, A Defence of History and Class Consciousness: Tailism and the Dialectic 159-60
(Verso 2000) (Esther Leslie, trans).
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vitude volontaire.2 Why do the many submit to the tyranny of the
few? Why do "a hundred" or "a thousand" "endure the caprice of a
single man?" 3 De la Bo6tie offers three answers. The first is the
force of custom and habit: enslaved people become "degraded,
submissive, and incapable of any great deed." 4 The second is
"bread and circuses" 5 plus the gullibility of the subjects: "Plays,
farces, spectacles, gladiators, strange beasts, medals, pictures,
and other such opiates, these were for ancient peoples the bait
toward slavery, the price of their liberty, the instruments of tyranny."6 The third answer is that the tyrants surround themselves with dependents, who in turn have their own dependents.7
In short, the three answers, in modern parlance, amount to cultural inertia, manufactured consent, and patronage.
Wilhelm Reich asks the question no less directly. "[W]hat
has to be explained," he writes, is "why the majority of those who
are hungry don't steal and why the majority of those who are
exploited don't strike."8 More directly still-why do people accept
governments and follow leaders and vote for politicians when
doing so is against their interests? Here is a graphic and contemporary version of the question from Thomas Frank's What's
the Matter with Kansas?9 How can we explain the phenomenon
of sturdy blue-collar patriots reciting the Pledge while
they strangle their own life chances; of small farmers
proudly voting themselves off the land; of devoted family
men carefully seeing to it that their children will never be
able to afford college or proper health care; of workingclass guys in midwestern cities cheering as they deliver
2 Etienne de la Boetie, The Politics of Obedience: The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude (Free Life 1975) (Harry Kurz, trans).
3 Id. See also Michael Rosen, On Voluntary Servitude: False Consciousness and the
Theory of Ideology63 (Harvard 1996).
4 De la Boetie, Politics of Obedience at 68 (cited in note 2). See also Rosen, On VoluntaryServitude at 63 (cited in note 3).
5 The idea, originating in Juvenal's Satires, that the Roman populace could be appeased and distracted by means of free wheat and costly circus games. For a classic modem discussion, see generally Paul Veyne, Bread and Circuses: Historical Sociology and
PoliticalPluralism (Viking and Penguin 1990) (Brian Pearce, trans).
6 De la Boetie, Politics of Obedience at 69-70 (cited in note 2). See also Rosen, On
VoluntaryServitude at 63 (cited in note 3).
7 De la Boetie, Politics of Obedience at 78-79 (cited in note 2). See also Rosen, On
VoluntaryServitude at 63 (cited in note 3).
8 Wilhelm Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism 53 (Penguin 1970) (Vincent R.
Carfagno, trans). See also Rosen, On Voluntary Servitudeat 1 (cited in note 3).
9 Thomas Frank, What's the Matter with Kansas?- How Conservatives Won the
HeartofAmerica (Metropolitan 2004).
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up a landslide for a candidate whose policies will end
their way of life, will transform their region into a "rust
belt," will strike people like them blows from which they
will never recover[?]' 0
Given the limits of this short Article, I will offer, like de la
Bo6tie, a trio of capsule answers. Each answer identifies a different kind of mechanism. The first two are obvious and widely accepted, but the third is contentious.
The first obvious answer assumes that people have given desires and beliefs. This answer embraces the gamut of incentives
they face: positive and negative sanctions; actual and potential
costs and benefits; offers and threats; and, following Robert
Nozick, "throffers," that is, offers the refusal of which is seen as
threatening." It is hardly surprising that people seek advantages
and believe in promises, only to find themselves disappointed,
disadvantaged, and disillusioned by false promises. And people
will comply with regimes that oppress or suppress them out of
the fear of the consequences of noncompliance. James C. Scott
observes that "slaves, serfs, untouchables, the colonized, and
subjugated races" will typically exhibit "reactions and patterns of
resistance that are [ ] broadly comparable." They are likely, behind the scenes, "to create and defend a social space in which
offstage dissent to the official transcript of power relations may
be voiced."12 The simplest cases are those of overt coercion where
the interests of the oppressed are clear. Examples include slavery, blacks in apartheid South Africa, and national minorities in
oppressive circumstances (for example, Kurds in Turkey). But
there are also subtler cases, where the regime induces complicity
in a social world of mutual and generalized distrust and suspicion, as in Vaclav Havel's essay The Power of the Powerless,
where a greengrocer puts up a sign saying "Workers of the
World, Unite!"-a slogan he scorns-for fear of the consequences
of not doing SO. 1 3 Moreover, the fear need not be actively induced
by the powerful, who may not even be present or active, as in

10 Id at 10.
11 Robert Nozick, Coercion, in Peter Laslett, W.G. Runciman, and Quentin Skinner,
eds, Philosophy,Politics and Society: Fourth Series 101-35 (Blackwell 1972).
12 James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcrzpts xi
(Yale 1990).
13 Vaclav Havel, The Power of the Powerless,in Vaclav Havel, et al, The Power of the
Powerless: Citizens Against the State in Central-EasternEurope 27-28 (Hutchinson
1985) (John Keane, ed).
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Michel Foucault's emblematic account of Jeremy Bentham's
Panopticon, symbolizing modern disciplinary power.14
The second obvious answer also takes people's desires and
beliefs as given. It proposes that what they face is a lack of alternatives. Here we are dealing with powerlessness to resist or act
otherwise. There are many variants of this lack of alternatives,
but they can be seen as falling into two broad kinds. The lack
may be of actual or real alternatives. A national minority may
have no institutional means of expression, such as a political
party. There may be no countervailing power to the dominant
one because civil society is weak or nonexistent. Mobilization
may be bound to fail because the collective action problem cannot
be solved. Trade unions and political parties may be banned or
seriously discouraged. Lack of actual opportunity can be economic, social, legal, or political. There may be no jobs or extensive
discrimination or legal barriers and even political exclusion, or
all of these, as with convicted felons in an economic downturn.
Or the lack may be subjective-a lack of awareness that there
can be alternatives. People can be trapped in a set of beliefs that
sanctifies the inevitability of existing inequalities. Where caste
prevails, there may be no prospect of changing one's status in
this life, and under traditional forms of male dominance, one's
gender-assigned status can be similarly inescapable. Moreover,
people can be persuaded to lower their expectations and adapt
their preferences to what they believe to be the only feasible option. (This was Margaret Thatcher's great success; as she famously said: "There is no alternative.") And indeed, these two
kinds of powerlessness-objective and subjective-may coincide:
people may be right to believe that they have no other realistic
choice than compliance, that there are no feasible alternatives to
servitude. On the other hand, they may not. This leads us to consider the third answer.
The third, contentious answer is, as I have suggested, typically associated with several provocative expressions, notably
false consciousness and real, objective, or true interests. Here,
the core idea is that acquiescence to an actual or potential government or regime, and even enthusiastic support for its
spokesmen and advocates, can be the result of our mistaking or
misconceiving where our interests lie. It is worth noting that this

14 See generally Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish:The Birth of the Prison195228 (Vintage 1977) (Alan Sheridan, trans).
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need not be because we have been bamboozled by the powerful;
we can be fully engaged in bamboozling ourselves.
The contrary view was forcefully expressed by the classical
utilitarians, notably Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. The
latter saw that answer as paternalistic and asserted that "each is
the only safe guardian of his own rights and interests."15 This
view makes sense on Bentham's assumption that our interests
lie entirely in pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain, for we can
hardly be mistaken in our understanding of what these experiences consist in.16 Similarly, if, like most mainstream economists, you assume that one's interests consist merely in preference satisfaction, then it is hard to see who could be in a better
position than oneself to know whether one's preferences are satisfied. And yet John Stuart Mill's endorsement of the utilitarian
view is questionable, since he himself rejected both these assumptions, holding that one can be more or less expert about
where one's interests lie and that such expertise derives from
diversity of experience.' 7
A contemporary exponent of this third answer is Thomas
Frank, whom I quoted above. Frank's problem is to understand
the "cultural backlash": how to explain that people are preoccupied with cultural and religious issues rather than economic
ones, and how it is that "the Kansas conservative rebels profess
to hate elites but somehow excuse from their fury the corporate
world, even when it has so manifestly screwed them."18 One entirely convincing objection to Frank's way of posing the problem
is that it is arbitrary to just assume that people's real interests
are economic; we should take their priorities seriously, not assume them to be deluded because they see things differently. If
one believes that abortion is murder, how could one reasonably
allow it to count less than one's material comforts, or even necessities? Moreover, those, typically on the political left, who observe and deplore the failure of the disadvantaged to perceive
and pursue their material interests, are often precisely those
's John Stuart Mill, "Representative Government" in Utilitarianism,Liberty, and
Representative Government 208 (Dent and Dutton 1910).
16 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principlesof Morals and Legislation 11
(Athlone 1970) (J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart, eds) ("Nature has placed mankind under the
governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure.").
17 Mill, Utilitarianismat 164-65 (cited in note 15). Mill wrote: "Of two pleasures, if
there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable
pleasure." Id at 8.
1s Frank, What's the Matterat 113 (cited in note 9).
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whose interest in rectifying social injustice takes priority for
them over the pursuit of their own material advantages.
And yet-and this is my claim-the structure (though not
the content) of Frank's argument is correct. People can be deluded and delude themselves about what is in their interests. Our
first two answers to de la Bo6tie's question take our desires and
beliefs as given; the third answer allows that they, in turn, can
be subject to the power of others and of themselves. In allowing
the latter, it assumes that we are agents capable of reflecting
upon and modifying our desires and beliefs: that it is, to a greater or lesser extent, within our power to alter them. Our preferences-what we prefer-are, to a greater or lesser extent, malleable, that is, subject to being changed on the basis of reasoning
and reflection.19 The third answer also follows Mill in allowing
that we can be mistaken and misled in both ways-with respect
to what we desire and believe and in the beliefs that underpin
our desires, and thus we can ultimately be misled about where
our interests lie.
To deny this answer is to say something highly implausible.
As the legal philosopher Joel Feinberg has argued at some
length, we all have not only many interests but also many different kinds of interests that can be thought of as relating to one
another in networks of interest. These range from passing wants
(say, for ice cream) to instrumental wants (say, for money) to
welfare interests (such as health) to focal aims (such as a happy
marriage), which may, in turn, be means to other, divergent
ends.20 With respect to many of these, the question of what is in
our interests is susceptible of objective answers. There must, of
course, be "a very close connection between a person's interests
and his wants."2 1 But there are "situations in which a person
does not know his own interests," 22 and, indeed, there are "countless ways in which human interests might be classified: in terms
of ulteriority, minimality, degree of comprehensiveness, the type
of associated fulfilling activity, the characteristic mode of invasion, whether self- or other-regarding, and many more."23
19 The way that the concept of "preference" is typically deployed, especially by economists, tends to occlude this. For an example of a discussion of this concept, see Cass Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justicech 1 (Oxford 1997).
20 See generally Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the CriminalLaw: Harm to Others (Oxford 1984).
21 Id at 38.
22 Id.
23 Id at 55.
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Rather than exploring and elaborating this complexity here,
I shall conclude with two contemporary and topical illustrative
examples of false consciousness. Interestingly, they both exemplify what Bernard Harcourt has called "the illusion of free markets"-that is, the notion, which emerged and matured with the
Physiocrats in the eighteenth century, that market processes are
'natural" and governmental intervention and regulation are artificial. 24 It is the illusion that "economic exchange constitutes a
system that autonomously can achieve equilibrium without government intervention or outside interference-and the eventual
metamorphosis of this idea, over the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, into the concept of the inherent efficiency of markets."2 5 As Harcourt comments, this "naturalization" of markets
helps to "shield from normative assessment the massive wealth
distributions that take place there" and "masks the state's role"
and "the extensive legal and regulatory framework" backed by
legal coercion that is everywhere present in supposedly free
market relations. 26
Consider first the successful campaign to repeal the estate
tax in the United States from the late 1990s and culminating in
2004. In a fine study of this campaign by Michael Graetz and Ian
Shapiro, the authors ask the excellent question: "Why would the
public broadly support repealing a tax paid by only 2 percent of
America's wealthiest taxpayers?"2 7 They provide several answers. One is wishful thinking: "[L]arge numbers of Americans
are unrealistically optimistic about their relative and absolute
economic circumstances. They underestimate the levels of inequality, overestimate their own wealth compared to others, and
exaggerate their likelihood of moving up significantly and getting
rich."2 8 A second answer is ignorance of the facts: thus "[n]onpartisan polling suggests that almost half of Americans believe
that 'most' families have to pay the estate tax, while only a third
believe that 'only a few' families have to pay it."29 And a third
answer is the effects of "framing." A relentless effort to shape
perceptions "flood[ed] the media with stand-alone polls on the
24 See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, The Illusion ofFree Markets: Punishment and
the Myth ofNatural Order(Harvard 2011).
25 Id at 26.
26 Id at 32.
27 Michael J. Graetz and Ian Shapiro, Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Fight over
TaxinginheritedWealth 118 (Princeton 2005).
28 Id at 119.
29 Id at 125.
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unfairness of the tax,"30 thereby isolating the issue from the
overall federal budget. The estate tax was decried as "double
taxation" and repeatedly described as the "death tax." By 2003,
"the fusion of 'death,' 'inheritance' and 'estate' taxes was so complete in the public mind" that, according to one conservative pollster, "it scarcely mattered which term was used."31
Consider finally the distinctive American political tradition
that unites paranoia about "liberal" elites with both faith in the
beneficent functioning of unregulated capitalism and the idea
that government intervention and taxation invade individual
property rights. That tradition's current incarnation in the Tea
Party movement operates at different intellectual levels. Its
leaders and promoters such as Glenn Beck recommend the reading of Frederic Bastiat, Ludwig von Mises, and Friedrich Hayek,
alongside Ayn Rand, Beck himself, and others, while its followers, according to the sociologist Donald Warren, are persuaded
that "only they could be trusted to look out for their own best
interests." 32 Consider, in particular, the case of Tom Grimes from
South Bend, Indiana, who lost his job as a stockbroker in January 2009.33 An admirer of Beck and reader of his recommended
books, he blamed the Obama administration's economic policies
for aggravating the recession and held that one has "to cut taxes,
cut expenses in the government and let the market go free and
wild."34 As journalist Kate Zernike reports,
He had been on Medicare and Social Security since he
was laid off. But he said he could do without those government programs. "If you quit giving people that stuff,
they would figure out how to do it on their own," he said.
"People would overcome it. It's the economic engine." 35
It is, of course, neither straightforward nor simple to justify
the claim that ordinary citizens supporting repeal of the "death
tax," on the one hand, and Tea Party supporters such as Tom
Grimes, on the other, are mistaken about what their interests
are, what harms them, what would best serve them, and who can
be trusted to look after them. But such a claim is subject to nei30 Id at 126.

31 Graetz and Shapiro, Death by a Thousand Cuts at 124 (cited in note 27).
32 Kate Zernike, Boiling Mad: Inside Tea Party America 59 (Times Books 2010).

33 Id at 11, 78.
3 Id at 78.
3 Id at 78-79.
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ther of the objections to the notion of false consciousness with
which this article began.
Both groups hold factual beliefs that are susceptible of truth
and falsity (thus meeting the second objection). Some of these
key beliefs can be shown to be false. Showing them to be so need
not involve the arrogance of claiming some privileged access to
the truth (the first objection). Ignorance of facts about the complex world in which we live, not least in the economic sphere,
can, after all, sometimes be distinguished from theoretical disagreement over how to explain them. Moreover, such ignorance
can have many explanations, including structured ignorance due
to local and narrow perspectives, as well as the manipulative
framing of issues by those whose interest, profession, and mission it is to shape our perceptions. 36
People in both groups are also, we must assume, authorities
with respect to judging what their interests are. But these are
fallible judgments. It is not always easy to know what your interests are, especially for those who are remote from what Marx
called the means of mental production. To judge well-to assess
rightly what policies or programs are in one's interest--one
needs, first, to have an adequate understanding of the status
quo; second, to have a convincing view of what is (counterfactually) feasible; and, third, to judge whether the costs of transition to
what might be a better situation are worth paying. Here too the
recognition of these sources of fallibility involves neither an arrogant claim to privileged access to truth nor the claim that
there is nothing for such judgments to be mistaken about.
I conclude that people can sometimes, even often, be mistaken about their interests and the mistakes they make can be conceptual and cognitive. At the deeper, conceptual level, as Harcourt shows, the mistakes concern fundamental categories for
explaining and understanding the social world, such as the placing of a distinction between what is "natural" and what is "artificial," resulting in illusions with far-reaching consequences that
occlude the constraints inherent in voluntary exchanges and preclude the raising of normative questions about their consequences for social justice. Cognitively, as cognitive psychologists have
abundantly shown, 37 people typically exhibit all kinds of irra36 For an interesting discussion of the concept of "structured ignorance," see Michael

Schwartz, Radical Protest and Social Structure: The Southern Farmers' Alliance and
Cotton Tenancy 1880-1890 150-53 (Academic 1976).
3 See, for example, the work of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman and many of
the writings of Jon Elster.
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tionality, including wishful and magical thinking. In particular,
they can exhibit what has been given the name of false consciousness. As our examples show, they can have systematically
distorted beliefs about the social order and their own place in it
that work systematically against their interests and they can feel
a "blanket distrust of institutions and an astonishing-and unwarranted-confidence in the self" 38 and, in general, be unable
to see what links "public issues" and policies with "private troubles." 39 To state these conclusions need not invoke any epistemic
privilege, while nonetheless assuming that, in these matters,
there is truth to be attained. But this, of course, leaves unaddressed the next task, which is to specify the various sources
of these failures of reasoning and understanding and to ascertain
to what extent they are irremediable and to what extent rectifiable.

Mark Lilla, The Tea Party Jacobins, 57 NY Rev of Books 53, 54 (May 27, 2010).
This phrase is adapted from the first chapter of C. Wright Mills, The Sociological
Imagination 3-24 (Oxford 1959).
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